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Abstract: Continuità transfrontaliera degli status familiari e questioni di ordine 
pubblico nell’Unione europea – Free movement and respect for human rights impact on EU 
Member States’ family law and conflict of law rules, granting EU citizens the right to 
recognition of a status acquired in (or under the rules of) another legal order. However, status 
can be prevented from producing effects in the forum if their recognition would be inconsistent 
with public policy. Having regard to the relevance of the EU citizen’s rights in the European 
integration process, this essay theorizes the need to resize the Member States’ sovereignty 
through a greatly attenuated public policy clause, notably when a minor’s status is at stake. 
Keywords: Right to private and family life; Free movement; Private international law; Human 
rights; Status recognition. 
1. Introduction 
As Advocate General La Pergola stated in his Opinion in Dafeki1, necessity 
to grant continuity of subjective legal positions under EU law, their protection, 
and therefore the idea itself of integration pursued by the European legal order, 
impose the «immutability of [personal] status» anytime «it constitutes an element of or 
prerequisite for a right of the individual» granted by Community Law. 
Status recognition is a matter ruled by private international law (PIL)2. A 
non-recognition of a status acquired abroad means that PIL led the law of the State 
where recognition is sought prevail over the law of status’ establishment. PIL 
arises from, and expresses, legislative policies and inner values of each legal order, 
but more and more frequently it gives in when dealing with supranational rules’ 
 
1 Case C-336/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:462. 
2 Scholars debate on whether recognition has to be intended as a conflict of law rules or if it 
is just an aim to pursue through other mechanisms of private international law. However, this 
issue will not be deepened in this paper. Cfr., on this topic, P. Lagarde, La méthode de la 
reconnaissance est-elle l’avenir du droit international privé? Conférence inaugurale, session de droit 
international privé, 2014 (Volume 371), in Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law, The Hague Academy of International Law; G. Rossolillo, Mutuo riconoscimento e tecniche 
conflittuali, Padua, 2002, 239 ff.; M. Fallon, J. Meeusen, Private International Law in the 
European Union and the Exception of Mutual Recognition, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 
2002, 37 ff.; M. Melcher, (Mutual) Recognition of Registered Relationships via EU Private 
International Law, in Journal of Private International Law, 2013, 149 ff.; H.P. Mansel, K. Thorn, 
R. Wagner, Europäisches Kollisionrecht 2010, in IPRax, 2011, 1 ff. 
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primacy3, notably EU law and binding human rights norms as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Indeed, as we will see infra, EU Member 
States’ PIL can come into conflict with supranational rules when it leads to non-
recognition. Unjustified conflicts will lead–directly or indirectly4–to displacement 
of the host State’s PIL and, consequently, to recognition of family status.  
This paper analyses the issue of the recognition in the EU of family 
relationships established in another Member State and comprised of (at least) one 
Union citizen. It will highlight how EU Law–and, to some extent, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)–impact on national PIL rules, in order to 
protect EU citizens’ legitimate expectation to have their cross-border family 
status recognized (paras no. 3, 4). Then, this paper explains under which 
circumstances national authorities can justifiably refuse recognition, notably on 
public policy grounds (para. no. 5-7). The paper argues that continuity of EU 
citizens’ family status requires a resizing of national legal orders’ sovereignty, 
through a greatly attenuated public policy clause, due to States belonging to a 
community of highly integrated supranational law. Paras. no. 8 and 9 examine 
recognition of status filiations as a case-study and show how the ‘best interests of 
the child’ principle calls for recognition in the State of the forum regardless of any 
public policy concern. 
2. Recognition of cross-border family status: a private international law 
perspective. 
Situations like mixed marriages and partnerships, double citizenship, adoption of 
foreign children and migration, give rise to complex cross-border cases all over 
Europe5. People move from one Country to another, along with their family 
members. Movement of people often means movement of families and family ties. 
Citizens expect a validly established family tie to be deemed equally valid abroad6. 
They expect their family ties to be protected in their content, extent and stability, 
in space and time7.  
 
3 On these aspects see J. Guillaumé, The Weakening of the Nation-State and Private International 
Law. The “Right to International Mobility”, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2012/2013, 
519 ff. 
4 In this context ‘directly’ means ‘by virtue of the sole existence of the supranational rules’, 
irrespectively from a national measure implementing it. 
5 More than 13 million of European citizens reside in an EU Country other than that of 
nationality. ‘International’ couples living in the EU are 16 million. Data published on 
December 6th, 2017 in A Europe for mobile and international families, European Parliamentary 
Research Service Blog, epthinktank.eu/2017/12/07/a-europe-for-mobile-and-international-
families/ 
6 This is especially true within a quite culturally homogeneous society as the European one. 
EU Member States share many common fundamental values, first of all those mentioned at 
Article 2 TEU and those affirmed by the ECHR and by the Charter of fundamental rights of 
the European Union (EU Charter). 
7 Thus, we refer to recognition of family status established abroad as ‘the right to cross-border 
continuity of family status’. R. Baratta, La reconnaissance internationale des situations juridiques 
personnelles et familiales, in Recueil des cours, tome 348 (2011), 253 ff., 272, 320, defines the issue 
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However, the protection of this expectation is not to be taken for granted. 
Indeed, States have no obligation to recognize the validity of status and 
relationships established under the rules of another national legal system8. 
Therefore, uncertainty for EU citizens in cross-border situations derives from 
differences still existing within the EU Member States’ private law, notably in 
family law9, civil status matters10 and in their PIL, which express of their social, 
cultural and legal identity11.  
Traditionally, the recognition of a family relationship acquired under a 
foreign system is ruled by the State of the forum’s PIL. Where PIL asks for the 
application of the law of the State in which family relationship established (‘lex 
causae’), the host State’s authorities may consider it incompatible with domestic 
legislation (‘lex fori’), thus refusing the recognition of the status acquired abroad. 
Lack of EU competences in family law, civil status, and harmonized PIL rules on 
establishment and recognition of family status, makes the legal framework in such 
matter extremely fragmented. Hence, it fosters a closed attitude towards foreign 
legal principles and relationships12. Consequently, (international) public policy 
clause operates as a limit to application of foreign rules by the State in which status 
recognition is sought13, in order to preserve its innermost values and principles. 
 
in terms of «besoin social de continuité et de stabilité de l’état de la personne» and of 
«portabilité des relations familiales». 
8 As noted G. Biagioni, On Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships, in D. 
Gallo et a. (Eds), Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions, 
Berlin, 2014, 359 ff. A different regime distinguishes the US legal order, where the Supreme 
Court, in its much-awaited ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, (judgment of 26 June 2015, case no. 
576 US (2015), held that same-sex marriages lawfully performed in one US State must be fully 
recognized in all the other US States. 
9 Family patterns adopted by different legal orders may differ more or less relevantly. Thus, 
a legal order may provide for family relationships unknown (if not even forbidden) in another 
legal order: that is the case, for example, for registered partnerships or same-sex marriages. 
Otherwise, a State may provide for a family status on grounds that are not recognized as valid 
in another State: parenthood, for example, is a universally recognized family tie, while only a 
few legal orders in the world provide for parenthood following surrogate motherhood. 
10 International conventions (such as the one produced by the International Commission on 
Civil Status), and, more recently, a EU Regulation (no. 2016/1191 of 6 July 2016, OJ L 200 
of 26.7.2016, 1 ff.) afford some harmonisation. However, Regulation no. 1191 does not apply 
to recognition of the legal effects of public documents issued by another Member State’s 
national authorities. See E. Pataut, Reconnaissance des documents publics: vers un état civil 
européen?, in Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 2013, 920 ff. 
11 On the relationship between culture and family law in Europe, see W. Pintens, Family Law 
in Europe: developments and perspectives, in The Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa, 1, 2008, 155 ss.; M. Antokolskaia, Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A 
Historical Perspective, Antwerp, 2006; M.R. Marella, The Non-Subversive Function of European 
Private Law: The Case of Harmonisation of Family Law, in European Law Journal, 2006, 78 ff. 
12 This is considered one of the most visible deficiencies of the current PIL system, which, as 
it is structured, cannot handle conflict between different traditions and legal cultures in that 
field, thus avoiding such consequences. Cfr. M. Lehmann, What’s in a name? Grunkin-Paul and 
beyond, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2008, 138.  
13 Public policy (ordre public) doctrine in private international law finds its roots in 19th 
Century, when it was noted that «foreign laws which are repugnant to fundamental principles 
of the lex fori, or to religion or morality, cannot claim adoption under the general comity of 
nations». Cfr. J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: Foreign and Domestic, in Regard to 
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Therefore, when a EU citizen moves to a State (the ‘host State’ or ‘State of 
destination’) other than that in which his/her family relationships have been 
established, national authorities do not recognize validity and/or efficacy of those 
family ties, thus making them void and irrelevant in the host legal order. Even 
where family ties are recognized as valid, host State’s legislation might downgrade 
them within the legal scheme of a different (usually less protected) status14.  
Both situations are referred to as ‘limping status’15. This issue affects status 
established years before request for recognition, as well as status the establishment 
of which were the only reason why people moved abroad and then immediately 
moved back to the country of origin asking for recognition16.  
Limping status might cause devastating consequences to status holder and 
his/her family members, such as impossibility to gain the citizenship of a given 
State, benefit from migration rights like family reunification and determine who 
holds parental responsibility or obligations of maintenance to a child or to a former 
spouse following divorce. In terms of EU law, restriction to free movement of 
people, genuine or strictly aimed at getting the status established, and eventually 
interference with the fundamental rights to private and family life may occur. 
Therefore, individuals can find protection under the EU legal order and the 
Council of Europe system. 
3. Recognition, non-discrimination and the right to freely move and reside 
in the EU.  
Lack of competence does not mean that EU law cannot exercise any influence on 
cross-border status. EU law intersects family law17 in different areas, including 
EU citizenship, free movement, fundamental rights, social policy, migration 
policy, the completion of the Internal market and of the Area of freedom, security 
 
Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions, 
and Judgments, Boston/London, 1872, par. 373 ff. 
14 M. Melcher, Private International Law and Registered Relationships: an EU Perspective, in 
European Review of Private Law, 2012, n. 4, 1078. Downgrading is what happens in Italy under 
Law no. 76/2016, where same-sex marriages celebrated abroad are recognized ope legis as 
mere registered partnerships. 
15 K. Doremberg, Hinkende Rechtsverhältnisse im internationalen Familienrecht, Berlin, 1968. 
16 The second case mostly involves a status whose establishment is prohibited–at all or under 
specific circumstances–in the State of origin or residence (e.g. legal parentage established 
through adoption is permitted by both the State of origin and the host State, but only the 
latter permits adoption by a single parent or by same-sex partners). 
17 See, ex multis, H. Fulchiron, La construction d’un droit “européen” de le famille: entre coordination, 
harmonisation et uniformisation, in Revue des affaires européennes, 2014, 309 ff.; I. Queirolo, 
Integrazione europea e diritto di famiglia, in N. Parisi, M. Fumagalli Meraviglia, A. Santini, D. 
Rinoldi (Eds), Scritti in onore di Ugo Draetta, Naples, 2011, 585 ff.; C. Honorati, Verso una 
competenza della Comunità europea in materia di diritto di famiglia?, in S. Bariatti, C. Ricci, L. 
Tomasi (Eds), La famiglia nel diritto internazionale privato comunitario, Milan, 2007, 3 ff.; R. 
Baratta, Verso la “comunitarizzazione” dei principi fondamentali del diritto di famiglia, in Rivista 
di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2005, n. 3, 573 ff.; P. Mengozzi, I problemi giuridici 
della famiglia a fronte del processo di integrazione europea, in Famiglia e diritto, 2004, 643 ff. 
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and justice (judicial cooperation in civil matters)18. Some EU pieces of legislation 
indirectly concern family relationships19, where a prejudicial relationship exists 
between the status and the exercise of a right provided for by the EU20. Member 
States, therefore, must evaluate carefully the grounds for a potential denial of 
status recognition, in order to not prevent the effectiveness of EU law and 
eventually infringe it. Moreover, despite formal distribution of competences 
between EU and Member States, there cannot be any national rule, even in an area 
that falls to be regulated exclusively by the latter, whose application may 
constitute a breach of EU law. Hence, the use of national competences always has 
to be in accordance to EU law. This justified the intervention by the CJEU 
(through the preliminary ruling procedure)21, which scrutinized the compatibility 
of some national rules affecting personal status recognition with the principle of 
 
18 See G. De Baere, K. Gutman, The impact of the European Union and the European Court of 
Justice on European family law, in J. Scherpe (Ed), European family law, vol. I, Cheltenham, 2016, 
5 ff.; G. Rossolillo, Rapporti di famiglia e diritto dell’Unione europea: profili problematici del 
rapporto tra dimensione nazionale e dimensione transnazionale della famiglia, in Famiglia e diritto, 
2010, 733 ff. 
19 Some are very controversial, such as de facto partnerships (Directive 2003/86/CE on the 
right to family reunification, in OJ L 251 of 3.10.2003, 12 ff.), registered partnerships 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of the Council, of 24 June 2016, in OJ L 183 of 8.7.2016, 30 ff.), 
and same-sex marriages (see Article 2, par. 2, lett. a), Directive 2004/38/CE). On the 
interpretation of the notion of ‘spouse’ under Directive 38 as not solely including the opposite 
sex partner, see the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
of 5 June 2018, case C-673/16, Coman and others, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, and even before H. 
Toner, Migration Rights and Same-Sex Couples in EU Law: A Case Study, in K. Boele-Woelki, 
A. Fuchs (Eds), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in Europe, Antwerp, 2012, 285, 286–
9. 
20 As highlighted by M. Fallon, Constraints of internal market law on family law, in J. Meeusen 
et a. (Eds), International family law for the European Union, Antwerp, 2007, 164, regulation of 
family status referred to by EU secondary law acts as a preliminary question to the application 
of EU law itself. On the protection of family status within the free movement of people and 
the EU policy on migration, see L. Tomasi, La tutela degli status familiari nel diritto dell’Unione 
europea, Padua, 2010. 
21 See judgments of 30 march 1993, case C-168/91, Konstantinidis, EU:C:1993:115; of 2 
October 2003, case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, EU:C:2003:539; of 14 October 2008, case C-
353/06, Grunkin-Paul, EU:C:2008:559; of 22 December 2010, case C-208/09, Sayn-
Wittgenstein, EU:C:2010:806; of 12 May 2011, case C-391/09, Runevic-Vardyn and Wardyn, 
EU:C:2011:291; of 2 June 2016, case C-438/14, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:401; of 8 June 2017, case C-541/15, Mircea Florian Freitag, EU:C:2017:432; 
of 5 June 2018, Coman and others, cited above in note 19. Cfr., ex multis, G. De Groot, Towards 
European Conflict Rules in Matters of Personal Status, in Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law, 2004, 115 ff.; A. Iliopoulou, What’s in a name? Citoyenneté, égalité et droit au 
nom. A propos de l’arrêt Garcia Avello, in Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 2004, 565 ff.; M. 
Castellaneta, Libera circolazione delle persone e norme statali sull’attribuzione del cognome, in 
Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali, 2009, 745 ff.; C. Honorati, Free Circulation Of 
Names For EU Citizens?, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2009, 379 ff.; J. Meeusen, The Grunkin 
and Paul Judgment of the ECJ, or How to Strike a Delicate Balance between Conflict of Laws, Union 
Citizenship and Freedom of Movement in the EC, in Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht, 2010, 
189 ff.; L. Besselink, Respecting Constitutional Identity in the EU, in Common Market Law Review, 
2012, 671 ff.; E. Cusas, Arrêt “Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff”: la libre circulation et les titres de 
noblesse, in Journal de droit européen, 2016, n. 232, 317 ff.; A. Tryfonidou, Free Movement of Same-
Sex Spouses within the EU: The ECJ’s Coman judgment, online in europeanlawblog.eu; G. Kessler, 
La consécration par la CJUE du droit de séjour du conjoint de même sexe du citoyen européen: un pas 
supplémentaire vers la libre circulation des situations familiales au sein de l’Union européenne?, in 
Journal du droit international, 2019, 27 ff. 
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non-discrimination (Article 18 TFEU) and EU citizens’ free movement right 
(Article 21 TFEU) 22. 
The Court’s judgments concerned non-recognition of EU citizens’ surnames 
bestowed under another Member State’s rules. The host State’s authorities 
registered the citizens with a different surname, determined under the lex fori. 
In its case-law, the CJEU broadly interpreted the principle of non-
discrimination and the right to free movement23, thus allowing linkage of their 
compliance to previous mutual recognition of personal status, as long as denial of 
recognition would have consisted in denying the relevance of citizenship in 
another MS (and thus discrimination on the grounds of nationality24), or a 
restriction on exercise of free movement, as it could cause serious inconveniences 
at administrative, professional and private levels25. Therefore, despite EU 
legislation does not grant expressly automatic recognition of foreign measures on 
civil status, domestic legislations cannot lead to a non-recognition when this 
would breach EU Treaty law.  
No explicit suggestion on whether this reasoning is applicable to other EU 
citizens’ status emerges from this case-law. However, following the arguments 
developed in Grunkin Paul, a general right to mutual recognition of EU citizens’ 
status can be envisaged insofar as:  
 
22 Notable legal doctrine highlighted also the relevance of the principle of loyal cooperation 
between Member States, now referred to by Article 4 TEU. This principle would preclude, 
indeed, an a priori refusal to recognize cross-border family relationships, due to the neutral 
application of host State’s PIL. Cfr. R. Baratta, Problematic elements of an implicit rule providing 
for mutual recognition of personal and family status in the EC, in IPRax, 2007, 1, 4 ff., 8 ff. 
23 That is consistent with previous CJEU judgments on free movement of people, where the 
Court stated that EU rules granting such right must be interpreted in a broad way. See, ex 
multis, the judgment of 19 October 2004, Zhu and Chen, case C-200/02, EU:C:2004:639, 
notably at para. 31. 
24 Case García Avello concerned children who resided in Belgium while having both Belgian 
and Spanish nationality. At birth, they were bestowed a surname under the lex fori. Their 
parents applied for a change according to Spanish law; however, the Belgian authority rejected 
the application, as it was considered against the applicable domestic legislation. The Court 
considered that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality precluded Belgian 
authorities from refusing to grant an application for the surname of those children to be 
changed to that to which they were entitled according to Spanish law and tradition. Cfr. J. 
Meeusen, Le droit international privé et le principe de non-discrimination, in Recueil des cours, 2011, 
vol. 353, 9 ff., 127. 
25 CJEU has considered as a serious inconvenience the risk of being obliged to dispel doubts 
as to one’s identity because of discrepancy in names used in different countries (case Grunkin-
Paul, para. 26, and case Sayn, para. 70); encountering difficulties in proving family links with 
your own family members (case Runevic-Vardyn, para. 77, case Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, 
para. 46); being obliged to dispel doubts as to the authenticity of personal documents or the 
truthfulness of information contained in those documents (case Runevic-Vardyn para. 77); the 
risk that potential clients might confuse a professional with others, due to a surname spelling 
modification (case Kostandinidis); the risk of difficulties in benefiting from legal effects of 
diplomas or certificates drawn up in the name recognized in another Member State (case 
Garcia Avello, para. 36). According to such case law, other examples of ‘serious inconveniences’ 
could be considered, inter alia, the impossibility to access a more favourable fiscal regime, or 
pensions and social security benefits, or hospital visitation rights and other relevant rights 
that would be granted in case of family status’ full recognition. 
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a) National legislations share common guiding principles ruling each status26 
allowing a strengthened mutual trust upon which the principle of mutual 
recognition is inevitably grounded; 
b) That status contributes to building someone’s private and/or family life (as 
a means of personal identification and a link to a family) in the same manner 
as the surname does, and 
c) Refusal of recognition causes inconveniences of the utmost relevance in 
moving freely across the EU territory. 
When these prerequisites are met, EU citizens should be legitimately able 
to expect their family status to be recognized by the host State’s authorities. In 
other words, they should legitimately expect that EU law prevents any hindrance 
to free movement and/or any discrimination grounded on nationality, actually or 
potentially depending on the application of the lex fori PIL27. 
Although the CJEU case-law seemed to be settled on recognition of 
surnames, the most recent judgment in case Coman shows that the thesis 
supporting the circulation of other family status orders may be based on the same 
reasoning and arguments, despite the very strong differences existing between 
them and the different axiological weight given to them by States. In case Coman 
the CJEU held that the term “spouse” in Article 2(2)(a) of the Citizens’ Directive 
(2004/38/EC) is gender neutral and may include same-sex spouses. Therefore, 
Member States prohibiting same-sex marriages cannot rely on national law as 
justification to refuse the recognition of a same-sex marriage legally celebrated in 
another Member State28. Evidently, the Court refuses different applications of EU 
citizen’s freedom of movement, depending on national law’s discretion in allowing 
same-sex marriages or not. However, the Court significantly narrows the scope of 
its decision. First, it applies to the sole purpose of granting family reunification, 
while it does not impose recognition in order to grant other rights that are based 
on residency; then, the judgement concerns only couples married in an EU 
Member State and only if the marriage has been concluded during the Union 
citizen’s period of genuine (the emphasis is added by the Author) residence in that 
 
26 C. Honorati, Free circulation, cit., 396 ff. Notably, such commonality seems to exist with 
regards to recognition of same-sex marriages and (even more so) same-sex partnerships. 
Indeed, also thanks to the intervention of the ECtHR (see judgment of 21 July 2015, Oliari 
and other v. Italy, Applications no. 18766/11 and 36030/11), a consensus towards the need to 
regulate establishment and effects of same-sex formal relationships is progressively forming. 
The same goes for the fact that there should not be any discrimination against same-sex 
couples by excluding them from protections granted to formally-recognized different-sex 
unions. See ECtHR, 24 July 2004, Application no. 40016/98, Karner v. Austria, and 13 
February 2013, Application no. 19010/07, X et o. v. Austria, 23 February 2016, Application no. 
68453/13, Pajić v. Croatia; CJEU, 1 April 2008, case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Büchnen, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179, 10 May 2011, case C-147/08, 
Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECLI:EU:C:2011:286; 12 December 2013, case 
C-267/12, Hay v. Crédit agricole, ECLI:EU:C:2013:823. 
27 G. Rossolillo, Identità personale e diritto internazionale privato, Padua, 2009, 204. 
28 The judgment applies to same-sex spouses but not necessarily to registered partners, who 
are entitled to a derived right of residence only if «the host Member State treats registered 
partnerships as equivalent to marriage», as required by Directive 38, Article 2, no. 2, lett. b). 




Thus, we can conclude that EU law eventually interferes with domestic 
legislation protecting EU citizens’ right to a status’ cross-border continuity. At 
the same time, however, we must stress that EU law guarantees this right only in 
situations linked with its legal order, and only insofar as this functions to 
guarantee effective exercise of free movement or to prevent discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. 
4. Cross-border continuity of family status as part of the fundamental right 
to private and family life. 
Fundamental rights and private international law are not considered mutually 
neutral anymore29, so protection of human rights may impose States to regulate 
the coordination between national legal orders according to binding pieces of 
legislation as the ECHR and the EU Charter30.  The Court of Strasbourg, indeed, 
has already stated that right to recognition is nothing less than one of the possible 
effects of the right to private and family life granted by Article 8 ECHR31. Non-
recognition, therefore, interferes with Article 832 insofar as a valid family 
 
29 Separation between conflict of law rules and human rights rested primarily on the divergent 
goals distinguishing the two matters; while the former deals with coordination between legal 
orders, the latter are imperative rights that aim to be universally implemented and 
consequently eliminate any dystonia between different legal systems. See, among others, F. 
Matscher, Le droit international privé face à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, in 
Travaux du Comité français de droit international privé, Paris 1996-97, 211; P. Kinsch, Droits de 
l’homme, droits fondamentaux et droits international privé, in Recueil des Cours, 2005, t. 318; L. 
Picchio Forlati, Critères de rattachement et règles d’applicabilité à l’heure de la protection des droits 
de l’homme en Europe, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2005, 907; F. Marchadier, Les objectifs 
généraux du droit international privé à l’épreuve de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 
Bruxelles, 2007; L.R. Kiestra, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private 
International Law, The Hague, 2014; G. Carella, Sistema delle norme di conflitto e tutela 
internazionale dei diritti umani: una rivoluzione copernicana?, in Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 2014, 523 ff.; F. Salerno, Il vincolo al rispetto dei diritti dell’uomo nel sistema delle 
fonti del diritto internazionale privato, Ibid., 2014, 549 ff.; J. Fawcett, M.N. Shuilleabhain, S. 
Shah, Human Rights and Private International Law, Oxford, 2016; Y. Lequette, Le droit 
international privé et les droits fondamentaux in R. Cabrillac, M.-A. Frison-Roche, T. Revet (Eds), 
Libertés et droits fondamentaux, Dalloz, 23ème édition, 2017, 125. On the intersection between 
human rights and PIL on status recognition, see G. Rossolillo, L’identità personale tra diritto 
internazionale privato e diritti dell’uomo, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2007, 1028 ff. 
30 G. Carella, La convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo e il diritto internazionale privato: ragioni 
e prospettive di una ricerca sui rapporti tra i due sistemi, in Id. (Ed), La convenzione europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo e il diritto internazionale privato, Turin, 2009, 10. 
31 Article 8 protects the right to private and family life. Member States of the Council of 
Europe must, on the one hand, refrain from engaging in any ‘interference’ with respect to the 
right enshrined therein, unless the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 are met (i.e. the 
interference ‘is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’); 
on the other hand, States must implement measures aimed at granting, through positive 
obligations, effective respect for private and family life. 
32 Among the most relevant ECtHR decisions, see those of 6 May 2004, in case Hussin v. 
Belgium (Application no. 70807/01), of 28 June 2007, in case Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. 
Luxembourg (no. 76240/01, noted by P. Kinsch, in Rev. crit. DIP, 2007, 807 and by d’Avout, in 
Journal du Droit International, 2008, 183), McDonald v. France (no. 18648/04), of 6 July 2010, 
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status33 acquired abroad is protected by the Convention–that is to say when the 
parties have acquired it in good faith34. The CJEU has never applied Article 7 EU 
Charter as main nor only reference to impose recognition as a peculiar form of the 
right to private and family life. It has mentioned how non-recognition may affect 
the family life that European citizens created or strengthened in the host Member 
State (and that it is protected under Article 7 EU Charter); yet the Court assessed 
national measure’s relevance to EU law only through Article 21 TFEU.  
However, it does not mean that the affirmation of fundamental right to 
family life in the CJEU case-law is just an obiter dictum. On the one hand, the CJEU 
had already abolished a restriction to free movement within the EU on this 
ground35. On the other hand, national measures liable to obstruct free movement 
of persons may be justified or not; indeed, justification is admitted only where such 
a measure does not conflict with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Charter. The same goes for Article 24(2) of the EU Charter when domestic 
measures concern children. Thus, where non-recognition or downgrading affect 
free movement, they must be assessed in light of fundamental rights. 
Since the rights guaranteed by Article 7 EU Charter36 correspond to those 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, according to Article 52 EU Charter, the 
former has to be interpreted in line with the latter–having the same meaning and 
 
in case Mary Green and Ajad Farhat v. Malta (no. 38797/07), of 3 May 2011, in case Negrepontis-
Giannisis v. Greece (no. 56759/08, noted by P. Kinsch in Rev. crit. DIP, 2011, 889; Dionisi-
Peyrusse in Journal du Droit International, 2012, 213). See P. Kinsch, Recognition in the Forum 
of a Status Acquired Abroad – Private International Law and European Human Rights Law, in K. 
Boele-Woelki, T. Einhorn, D. Girsberger, S. Symeonides (Eds), Convergence and Divergence in 
Private International Law – Liber Amicorum Kurt Siehr, The Hague, 2010, 259 ff.; Id., Private 
International Law Topics Before the European Court of Human Rights, in Yearbook of Private 
International Law, 2011, 37 ff.; P. Franzina, Some Remarks on the Relevance of Article 8 of the 
ECHR to the Recognition of Family Status Judicially Created Abroad, in Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 2011, 609. 
33 ‘Valid’ means ‘acquired legally, validly and effectively, meeting both formal and substantial 
standards according to the State of origin’s law’. 
34 Although the ECHR mechanism is quite similar to that defined by the CJEU (i.e., 
international rules working as a corrective to the application of national conflict of law rules 
leading to non-recognition), it cannot ask for immediate displacement where domestic rules 
would have led to deprive the status of any validity or effectiveness in the host State. Indeed, 
displacement is a consequence of EU law primautè and it doesn’t belong to pure international 
law, unless domestic legislation expressly states otherwise (as in Article 55 of the French 
Constitution). However, it is not that Council of Europe member States can ignore the 
outcomes of the Court of Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. National courts must interpret domestic 
measures according to obligations stemming from the ECHR and the ECtHR decisions, while 
national legislators must amend domestic law if necessary to comply with such obligations. 
Within the Italian legal system, where judges resorted to all the interpretative tools and 
nonetheless failed to give prevalence to the international obligation in the case, they have the 
duty to raise an issue of constitutionality. The international rule, therefore, will operate as an 
interposed parameter of constitutionality. See E. Lamarque, Gli effetti delle sentenze della Corte 
di Strasburgo secondo la Corte costituzionale italiana, in Corriere giuridico, 7/2010, 955 ff. 
35 As noted by C. Honorati, Free circulation, cit., 396, referring to case Carpenter, judgment of 
11 July 2002, case C-60/00, EU:C:2002:434. 
36 Private and family life is considered a EU citizens’ fundamental right. See M. González 
Pascual, A. Torres Pérez (Eds), The Right to Family Life in the European Union, London/New 
York, 2017. 
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scope37–and the limitations which may legitimately be imposed on the former are 
those allowed by paragraph 2 of the latter38. Under this perspective, a reference to 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is necessary in order to define the boundaries of 
a legitimate measure refusing the recognition or downgrading the status in the 
host EU Member State.  
5. Restrictions to recognition of family status.  
EU citizens shall claim a ‘foreign’ status to be recognized as valid in every Member 
State; however, EU law does not lay down an imperative rule of automatic 
recognition. A national measure can lead to a non-recognition any time it passes 
the ‘Cassis de Dijon test’39, i.e. it is justified by objective and overriding reasons of 
public interest, has non-discriminatory effect, is proportionate to its objective and 
is necessary to protect the interests which it is intended to secure (that is to say 
that less restrictive measure could not protect adequately such interest)40. Where 
the application of national rules fails to strike a fair balance between the interests 
at stake, an infringement of EU Law occurs. It will be for the national court to 
decide whether non-recognition reflects a fair balance between the interests in 
issue41. Hence, it is somehow worrying that the CJEU gave no suggestions 
regarding under which prerequisites the State’s interests can prevail on individual 
rights. Indeed, even a ‘serious inconvenience’ to EU citizens does not necessarily 
imply that public interest must be disregarded, as a ‘fair balance between the interests 
in issue’ may nonetheless be sought and may eventually lean on the State’s 
interest42. Therefore, more references would be desirable. Fortunately, the ECHR 
case law provides for some very useful information about that. Indeed, being non-
recognition (or downgrading43) of a status an interference with human rights, it 
 
37 Combined provision of Article 6, para. 3, TEU and Article 52, para. 3, EU Charter shows 
that fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law and 
insofar as the EU Charter contains rights corresponding to those guaranteed by the ECHR 
the meaning and scope of the former shall be the same as those laid down by the Convention 
(if not more extended). See J. Kokott, C. Sobotta, Protection of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union: On the Relationship between EU Fundamental Rights, the European Convention 
and National Standards of Protection, in Yearbook of European Law, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2015), 63 ff. 
38 As stated by Advocate General Jääskinen in his Opinion of 16 December 2010, case Runevic-
Vardyn, ECLI:EU:C:2010:784, para. 77. 
39 L. Tomasi, Il diritto al nome tra libertà di circolazione e diritti fondamentali, in C. Honorati (Ed), 
Diritto al nome e all’identità personale nell’ordinamento europeo, Milan, 2010, 133. 
40 For a reference to proportionality in EU law, see N. Reich, How proportionate is the 
proportionality principle?: some critical remarks on the use and methodology of the proportionality 
principle in the internal market case law of the ECJ, in H. Micklitz, B. De Witte (Eds), The 
European Court of Justice and the autonomy of the Member States, Cambridge, 2012, 83 ff. 
41 Case Runevic-Vardyn, para. 91. Here, the Court ruled that, according to Article 4, para. 2, 
TEU, the EU should respect Members States’ national identity, including the national official 
language. Therefore, national rules that aimed to protect national identity could be accepted, 
even if they restricted EU citizens’ free movement. However, if the national rules restricted it 
too much, then they would have to be set aside. 
42 Ibidem. 
43 However, the ECtHR held in Schalk and Kopf that downgrading does not necessarily consist 
of a breach of the ECHR. 
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requires justification under Article 7 EU Charter, as interpreted accordingly to 
Article 8 ECHR.  
Under the ECHR system, proportionality44 asks for some specific standards 
whereby one may assess the degree of protection that interests at stake deserve. 
Such standards shall apply before the CJEU too. From the individual interests’ 
perspective, a pivotal role is that of ‘stability of both the status and the relationship 
laying under it45, which is strictly linked to their ‘social reality’46. Therefore, 
national judges shall verify how strong is the link between the individual and the 
State where the status was established47 and how deeply the relationship is rooted 
in the social fabric and in involved individuals’ families48. 
Then come ‘intensity’ of the family ties affected by non-recognition49, risk of 
frustration of reasonable expectations50, nature of the interests at stake51 and–as 
affirmed in the CJEU case law too–gravity of the inconvenience caused to citizens 
seeking for recognition52.  From the State’s perspective, Article 8, para. 2, ECHR 
allows an interference when it is in accordance with national law53, it pursues one 
(or more than one) of the legitimate aims mentioned in the same paragraph and is 
considered as ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (meaning that it is grounded on 
 
44 J.J Cremona, The proportionality principle in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, in J.J Cremona, Selected papers 1990-2000. Vol. 2, Human rights and constitutional studies, 
San Gwann, 2002, 31 ff. 
45 P. Kinsh, Recognition in the Forum of a Status Acquired Abroad, cit., 266. Anyway, the Author 
cannot tell whether ‘stability’ means a ‘real and substantial link’, a ‘preponderant link’, or even 
an ‘exclusive link’, and refers the issue to the ECtHR. 
46 L.R. Kiestra, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private International 
Law, cit., 225. 
47 Recognition of status acquired in the State of nationality is usually grounded on a stricter 
link than that of a status acquired in a State in which the applicant stayed only occasionally or 
for a short period of time. However, conflicting opinions emerged on this topic. Notably, see 
R. Baratta, Problematic elements, cit., 10, who adopts a highly restrictive approach; contra, L. 
Tomasi, Il diritto al nome, cit., 136, who states that whatever kind of link between individuals 
and the State in which the status has been acquired, unless it is a ‘significative’ link, would be 
enough. Advocate General Sharpston, in her Opinion in case Grunkin-Paul (Opinion issued on 
24 April 2008, EU:C:2008:246), at para n. 86, assessed as justified the denial of recognition in 
cases where there is no «real link» between an individual and his/her place of birth. 
48 Social reality depends, for example, on the duration of undisturbed enjoyment of the status, 
as held by the ECtHR in Negrepontis-Giannisis, par. 75. 
49 The intensity is higher when the status has been established by firm will of two adults, who 
were conscious of legal implications of their act, such as in a marriage or a registered 
partnership or an adoption of a grown-up (see again case Negrepontis-Giannisis). 
50 For example, as held by the ECtHR in case Wagner, in light of a sudden change in host 
State’s legislation or practice. 
51 See Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 42857/05, § 60. For example, a very 
intimate issue of somebody’s life as sexual orientation (as in case Oliari, cited supra in note 26), 
or the best interests of the child, that must be assessed as primary whenever recognition is 
sought in respect of a status involving a minor (see infra, at para. 8, cases Mennesson v. France 
and Labassee v. France). 
52 ECtHR judgment of 25 November 1994, in case Stjerna v Finland (Application no. 
18131/91), para. 42. 
53 The Strasbourg Court has established a threefold test to determine whether an interference 
is in accordance with the law. The scheme leads the Court to evaluate: 1) the presence of a 
national law; 2) the clearness and precision of its wording; and 3) the aim it pursues. See I. 
Roagna, Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 2012, 37, online on www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf 
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a ‘pressing social need’). Member States have a margin of appreciation in 
determining what is deemed so necessary for the collective interest to justify a 
restriction to citizens’ fundamental rights. Margin of appreciation narrows when 
a ‘consensus’ among Member States in regulating a specific issue54 can be found; 
vice versa, the margin widens when the interference is grounded on national 
security, social or economic policy, ethics or moral55. However, in reviewing the 
State’s assessment in this regard, the Court will evaluate whether the interference 
was proportionate and whether there could have been a less restrictive measure 
equally adequate to protect public interests. 
6. Restrictions grounded on (international) public policy. 
Under both EU and ECHR rules, public policy is considered an interest a State 
can legitimately protect where refusing the recognition of a foreign status. Indeed, 
in practice, public policy is the most common ground for a non-recognition order 
by national authorities56 (as it was in the CJEU cases Sayn-Wittgenstein, Bogendorff 
von Wolffersdorff57 and Coman58, and in the ECtHR cases Mary Green and 
Negrepontis-Giannisis). Thus, it is necessary to understand to what extent parties’ 
legitimate expectation of stability of the status acquired abroad can be restricted 
by Member States on public policy grounds without infringing the binding 
obligations deriving from European rules.  
International and EU law do not harmonize international public policy. 
Indeed, public policy in private international law is not a concept of international, 
but of domestic law. Therefore, each domestic legal order has its own notion of 
public policy. However, it is a common feature that this clause is aimed to protect 
domestic legal order’s coherence and basic values, as it operates as a limit to avoid 
unacceptable results either of the application of a foreign law or of the recognition 
and enforcement of a foreign decision59. As what is perceived as fundamental, 
 
54 State’s margin of appreciation, therefore, narrows where the Court’s capacity to interpret 
the standard consensus consolidated around the criterion used by the State to justify the 
interference increases. This implies that the Court’s control can be much more penetrating 
than a mere control of ‘legitimacy’, but can also affect other aspects connected with the 
necessity for the measure. See on the topic of consensus К. Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and 
the Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights, Cambridge, 2015. 
55 N.A. Moreham, The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human 
Rights: A Re-examination, in European Human Rights Law Review, 2008, 1, 48. 
56 See P. Lagarde, Différences culturelles et ordre public en droit international privé de la famille, in 
Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international, session de Cracovie, 2004, vol. 71-1, 11 ff. and vol. 71-
2, 139 ff. 
57 In Sayn and in Bogendorff, the Court ruled that the application of a national law prohibiting 
acquisition, possession or use of a title of nobility on the basis of which a Member State refuses 
to recognize one of its nationals’ surname as acquired in another Member State may be 
justified on public policy grounds.  
58 Where the Court held that recognizing a same-sex marriage for the purpose of family 
reunification does not threat the public policy of the host Member State, as such recognition 
does not require that Member State to provide, in its national law, for the institution of same-
sex marriage. 
59 See P. Lagarde, Recherches sur l’ordre public en droit international privé, Paris, 1959, and, more 
recently, Id., Public Policy, in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. III, Private 
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innermost values and principles of a legal order is not set in stone, international 
public policy’s content is a flexible and constantly evolving notion, in space and 
time60. Moreover, public policy’s applicability is affected by the context in which 
it has to apply. 
Where PIL is incorporated into the EU system, indeed, EU law redefines 
the role of conflict of law rules, thus ensuring that they implement the common 
market61. The nature of public policy clearly expressed in EU PIL and in the CJEU 
case law62 shows the common will of Member States to limit public policy’s 
application in very exceptional cases. A similar argument may be supported where 
an EU Member State’s domestic PIL interferes with EU law. On the one hand, 
CJEU has held that public policy, as justification for a derogation from a 
fundamental freedom, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope cannot be 
determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control by the EU 
institutions63. It follows, therefrom, that public policy may be relied on only if 
there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to an interest considered of 
fundamental relevance both in the Member State society and in the EU as a whole. 
On the other hand, principles that make up Member States’ international public 
policy are not solely domestic, but are taken also from supranational sources, 
namely EU and international human rights law. From the above we have to 
rethink the concept of what is essential to the forum (and, thus, what is 
unacceptable), towards an interpretation that is mainly centred on the European 
and international dimension of values and fundamental human rights. Notably, 
exercise of public policy clause to cross-border status’ recognition in the EU must 
take into due consideration two factors of utmost relevance: the centrality of 
Union citizenship as the fundamental status of the individual in the process of 
European integration64, and the incidence of this process on the scope of the 
forum’s international public policy. 
European Area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) is the ideal 
 
International Law, edited by K. Lipstein, ch. XI, 1994, 61 ff.; P. Barile, Ordine pubblico (dir. int. 
priv. proc.), in Enc. dir., XXX, Milan, 1980, 1106 ff. 
60 R. Quadri, Lezioni di diritto internazionale privato, Neaples, 1969, 312. 
61 L. Fumagalli, EC Private International Law and the Public Policy Exception. Modern Features 
of a Traditional Concept, in Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 6 (2004), 171 ff. 
62 Judgments of 4 February 1988, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v. Adelheid Krieg, 145/86, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:61; 10 October 1996, Bernardus Hendrikman and Maria Feyen v. Magenta 
Druck & Verlag GmbH, C-78/95, ECLI:EU:C:1996:380. 
63 See the judgment of 28 March 2000, Dieter Krombach c. André Bamberski, case C-7/98. 
64 The status of EU citizen is established in both Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU. 
Literature on the concept of EU citizenship is abundant. See J. Shaw, Citizenship: Contrasting 
Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism, in G. de Búrca, P. Craig (Eds), The 
Evolution of Eu Law, 2nd ed. 2011, 575 ff.; F. Wollenschläger, A New Fundamental Freedom 
Beyond Market Integration: Union Citizenship and Its Dynamics for Shifting the Economic Paradigm 
of European Integration, in European Law Journal, 2011, 1 ff.; E. Spaventa, Seeing the Wood 
Despite the Trees?: On the Scope of Union Citizenship and Its Constitutional Effects, in Common 
Market Law Review, 2008, 13 ff. Significantly, G. Caggiano, La “filigrana del mercato” nello status 
di cittadino europeo, in E. Triggiani (Ed), Le nuove frontiere della cittadinanza europea, Bari, 2011, 
209, states that «La cittadinanza europea qualifica il carattere costituzionale del processo 
dell’integrazione europea e trascende la mera sommatoria delle libertà del mercato e dei diritti 
fondamentali, che vi afferiscono». 
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development of an European integration process focused on citizens65, whose 
freedom of movement and protection (particularly in cross-border situations) are 
top priorities66 that require Member States to cooperate as effectively as possible. 
EU law, indeed, may restrain any Member States’ measure “which have the effect 
of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the 
rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union”67. The close 
correlation between AFSJ and EU citizenship68, both built on free movement 
right, implements, ultimately, the transition from ‘negative’ integration–typical of 
the Single market–founded on non-discrimination based on nationality, to 
‘positive’ integration, where citizens’ fundamental rights express the values of the 
political community in which they live. Fundamental rights include individuals’ 
identity 69, intended as a bundle of social and emotional relationships represented 
by family and personal status, and protected by Article 7 of the EU Charter70, 
similarly to the provisions of Article 8 ECHR and with the same force and 
effectiveness of EU primary law. In a highly integrated context like this, public 
policy should facilitate the reception of other Member States’ laws and judgments, 
and thus ensure a better continuity in treatment of cross-border private 
relationships. 
This approach considers that where States belong to a legal entity that is as 
culturally, socially, politically and economically integrated as the European Union 
is, international values deriving from the EU and from the ECHR must have 
primary relevance among the fundamental values protected by their international 
 
65 A. Di Stasi, Spazio europeo e diritti di giustizia, Padua, 2014, 8. The completion of the 
European Area is mentioned by the EU Charter, just like EU citizenship, as an expression of 
the choice made by the same Charter to put individuals at the centre of the European system. 
On the relevance assumed by individuals in the EU law, see also B. Nascimbene, La centralità 
della persona e la tutela dei suoi diritti, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2013, 9 ff.; L. Azoulai, S. 
Barbou des Places, E. Pataut (Eds), Constructing the Person in EU Law, Oxford/Portland, 2016. 
66 See Article 3, para. 2, TEU, which, as noted by A. Di Stasi, Spazio europeo e diritti di giustizia, 
cit., 4, put the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’s completion among the main 
aims of the EU, just after the promotion of peace, EU values and the well-being of its citizens. 
67 Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano, v. Office national de l’emploi, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
68 On this topic, see, ex multis, B. Nascimbene, F. Rossi Dal Pozzo, Diritti di cittadinanza e libera 
circolazione nell’Unione europea, Padua, 2012, 79 ff.; A. Tizzano, Alle origini della cittadinanza 
europea, in Diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2010, 1031 ff.; C. Morviducci, I diritti dei cittadini europei, 
Turin, 2010, 3 ff. 
69 Rectius: its continuity and stability. 
70 It is known that the Charter applies to EU institutions and Member States only in the 
implementation of EU law. Therefore, its applicability to family status would seem to be 
excluded. However, violation of the aforementioned rights due to non-recognition of family 
status would depend on the application of national rules but implementing a prerequisite of 
EU law, namely the right to free movement of EU citizens. In a similar situation (judgment 
of 5 October 2010, McB, case C-400/10 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2010:582) the CJEU has already 
upheld the extension of EU Charter’s scope. Cfr. C. Campiglio, L’applicazione della Carta dei 
diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea in materia familiare, in Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, 2015, 279 ff., notably 286 ff. Moreover, on the scope of the EU Charter, see B. 
Nascimbene, Il principio di attribuzione e l’applicabilità della carta dei diritti fondamentali: 
l’orientamento della giurisprudenza, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 2015, 49 ff. On the 
interrelation between family law and human rights in the EU, see G. De Baere, K. Gutman, 
The impact of the European Union and the European Court of Justice on European family law, in J. 
Scherpe (Ed), European family law, vol. I, Cheltenham, 2016, 15. 
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public policy71. At the same time, in situations falling within the scope of EU law–
especially in areas such as the AFSJ, where the highest integration is desirable–it 
is not allowed to rely on a broad, traditional and mainly domestically-oriented 
notion of public policy, whenever this consists of a conflict with the fundamental 
values of the EU72. 
AFSJ, indeed, «appears to be in the process of constructing a ‘public order’ 
at the level of the European Union founded on fundamental rights, citizenship and 
a community of values»73. Thus, genuine exercise of a fundamental right, as the 
right to freely move and reside in another Member State, must lead to a highly 
attenuated public policy clause74, as it cannot be a circumstance in which citizens 
are asked to sacrifice the most relevant issues of their individual identity in favour 
of collective interests. Based on that need, status will only be ruled to be contrary 
to public policy in very exceptional cases in which the collective interest, on the 
basis of a case by case evaluation of the specific circumstances, deserves a higher 
level of protection inasmuch as it expresses core values shared by Member States, 
such as human dignity, life, and equality of individuals. If it was the other way 
round, it would result in a contradiction that goes as far as to call into question 
the whole EU integration process. Therefore, when dealing with an issue so deeply 
linked to fundamental rights such as the protection of EU citizens’ personal and 
family identity, Member States should have a very narrow margin of application 
of their domestic international public policy. 
7. Fraude à la loi and (non-)recognition of family status. 
Nevertheless, a peculiar situation in which public policy concerns must be 
considered as predominant also as concerns family status, is fraude à la loi (in 
English ‘evasion of law’). A family status is considered acquired in fraude à la loi 
where the parties were aware that the relationship was intentionally brought 
 
71 Cfr. O. Feraci, L’ordine pubblico nel diritto dell’Unione europea, Milan, 2012; D. Rinoldi, 
L’ordine pubblico europeo, Naples, 2005. 
72 Such as in Sayn-Wittgenstein, where the national rule intended to protect equality between 
individuals, that is one of the core values protected by EU Law too. EU fundamental values 
form the core around which European experience consolidates and are therefore an 
indisputable premise of coexistence of the Member States within the EU. Such recalling for a 
common legal ground shared by Member States evokes the reference which the ECtHR makes 
to consensus while interpreting the clauses of interference to the exercise of civil freedoms. 
73 S. Coutts, The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as an Area of Legal 
Integration, in Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2011, 87 ff., 107. 
74 French legal doctrine and–with some peculiarities–Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions theorized 
‘attenuated public policy’ as a way to protect vested rights and therefore the stability of legal 
situations from damages that would result from their non-recognition, notably in situations 
where a link of the foreign situation with the forum lacks. See A. Bucher, L’ordre public et le but 
social en droit international privé, in Recueil des cours, tome 239 (1993), 9 ff.; M. Ekelmans, L’ordre 
public international et ses effets atténués, in J.-F. Romain (Ed), L’ordre public. Concept et applications, 
Bruylant, 1995, 283; J. Guillaume, Ordre public plein, ordre public atténué, ordre public de proximité: 
quelle rationalité dans le choix du juge?, in Le droit entre tradition et modernité, Mélanges Patrick 
Courbe, Paris, 2012, 295. Following the most recent CJEU case-law, see J. Carlier, Vers un ordre 
public européen des droits fondamentaux – L’exemple de la reconnaissance des mariages de personnes 
de même sexe dans l’arrêt Coman, in Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 2019, N°117, 203 ff. 
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about abroad in order to bypass a restriction or a prohibition provided for by 
legislation of the State in which they ask for recognition75. The evaded national 
rule is usually a public policy one. 
In the EU legal order, if the only parameter take into account following the 
CJEU reasoning is the relevance of the opposite interests and their balance, 
nothing seems to prohibit recognition of status acquired abroad in fraude à la loi. 
Therefore, under CJEU case law, exercise of free movement rights for the sole 
purpose of acquiring a status circumventing national law could not prevent 
recognition, even if recognition is asked immediately after acquisition76. Indeed, 
non-recognition may cause relevant inconveniences that could hinder EU citizens’ 
free movement at the very moment in which a status is established. If a new-born 
who was born in State X is not recognized (as soon as it is requested) as his/her 
father’s child in State Y, he/she may face consequences concerning (EU) 
citizenship’s acquisition, inheritance rights, free movement rights within EU, the 
right to be represented by his/her parents before public authorities, etcetera. 
Hence, even though status’ consolidation likely means a lot more inconveniences 
in case of denial of recognition and therefore a stronger interest of the applicant 
for his/her application to be accepted, a temporally stable social reality should not 
be strictly necessary in order to invoke legitimately status recognition under EU 
law. 
Actually, two strong arguments suggest to embrace the opposite conclusion. 
The first one is that of ‘abuse of EU law’. It must be borne in mind that in Centros77 
the CJEU held that a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to 
prevent its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the 
Treaty, to improperly circumvent its national legislation, which is considered an 
abuse of EU Law. This means that, even if in a specific case individual interest for 
 
75 For example, a same-sex marriage involving two Italian citizens and celebrated in The 
Netherlands because it is prohibited in Italy, or a parent-child relationship involving a couple 
of Slovenian citizen and a baby delivered by a British surrogate mother established following 
a surrogate motherhood that is legal in the UK but forbidden in Slovenia. However, evasion 
of law in private international law is as well committed in case of ‘avoidance’, that is if the 
application of law is avoided by intentionally not fulfilling the necessary requirements for 
application. See Evasion of laws (fraus legis), in Encyclopedia of Private International Law, edited 
by Jürgen Basedow, Giesela Rühl, Franco Ferrari, and Pedro de Miguel Asensio, Cheltenham, 
2017. 
76 Advocate General Sharpston, in her Opinion in Sayn-Wittgenstein, at para 57, noted that 
«[t]here can be no legitimate expectation in the maintenance of a situation which is contrary 
to express legislation», and that «[i]f it transpired that the appellant had acted in bad faith in 
seeking to [have registered a status] to which she knew she was not entitled, or had in any 
way misled any of the authorities in question, then [not recognition] might seem a just and 
proportionate measure». Nevertheless, the same Advocate General held that, the length of the 
period in which the ‘unlawful situation’ was allowed to continue, the issuance of certificates 
and other documents reporting the discussed status and the official use the appellant has made 
of the status arise questions of proportionality. They are factors to be weighed necessarily in 
the balance of interests (para 68), even in such a case of fraud or bad faith. So it could be held 
that even a fraudulently acquired status may deserve protection under EU Law when its 
stability and social reality is adequately settled and proved. This is even more true when the 
host State has played a role in the settling of the status (because of unclear praxis or 
legislation). 
77 Judgment of 9 March 1999, case C-212/97, EU:C:1999:126, para. 24. 
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recognition should prevail on public policy, abuse of law allows the Member State 
to restrict the application of EU Law thus preventing individuals from taking 
advantage of such rule, including Treaty rules on fundamental freedoms78. Parties’ 
behaviour could be considered an abuse merely on the basis of sufficient telling 
evidence, particularly considering the intention that moved the EU citizens to seek 
status acquisition abroad as assessed in relation to the allegedly abused EU 
provision’s aim79. Therefore, a principle of bona fide in exploiting EU law should 
apply in status recognition cases. This has been confirmed eventually by the CJEU 
in case Coman80, where acquisition during a period of genuine residence (the 
emphasis is added by the Author) is necessary for status recognition. 
The second argument is compliance with Article 7 EU Charter in the light 
of Article 8 ECHR and ECtHR case law. Indeed, the Court of Strasbourg has 
held81 that Article 8 ECHR grants higher protection to stable relationships and, 
more significantly, it protects only status that have been acquired by the parties 
in good faith abroad. The ECtHR had the same approach in case McDonald v 
France82, where the Court dealt with an applicant that resided abroad temporarily 
in order to obtain divorce decree under more convenient jurisdictional rules. Due 
to this perceived misuse (or ‘jurisdictional fraud’), the party’s expectation has not 
been assessed as legitimate, and refusal to recognize the status obtained abroad 
was not considered an interference to the right to respect for family life. Hence, in 
cases of fraus legis, where the parties were aware that the relationship was 
artificially brought about abroad, restrictions to free movement on public policy 
grounds are justified under the right to private and family life. However, the next 
paragraph will show how the ‘best interests of the child’ principle is able to subvert 
this conclusion where recognition concerns children’s personal and family status 
and notably status filiationis.  
8. Recognition of status filiationis (or how fraude à la loi and public policy 
cannot jeopardise the best interests of the child).  
Status filiationis follows the establishment–by operation of law, by the will of the 
parties or by order of a public authority (usually a judicial one)–of parental 
relationship. Such status is ruled by two (almost) universally adopted principles: 
 
78 Cfr. F. Munari, Il divieto di abuso del diritto nell’ordinamento dell’Unione europea, in Diritto e 
pratica tributaria, 4/2015, 519 ff., 522. See also S. Marinai, Frode alla legge e abuso del diritto nel 
diritto internazionale privato dell’Unione europea, in Il diritto dell’Unione Europea, 2017, 485 ff. 
79On the topic of abuse of EU Law see, among other, See also A. Saydé, Defining the concept of 
abuse of Union law, in Yearbook of European law, 33 (2014), 138 ff.; A. Adinolfi, La nozione di 
«abuso di diritto» nell’ordinamento dell’Unione europea, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale, 
2/2012, 329 ff.; K. Sørensen, Abuse of Rights in Community Law: A Principle of Substance or Merely 
Rethoric?, in Common Market Law Review, 2006, 423 ff.; M. Gestri, Abuso del diritto e frode alla 
legge nell’ordinamento comunitario, Milan, 2003; P.J. Wattel, Circumvention on National Law; 
Abuse of Community Law?, in Common Market Law Review, 1995, 1257 ff. 
80 At para. 40. 
81 See supra at para. 3. 
82 Decision of 29 April 2008, Application no. 18648/04, in Journal de Droit Internationale, 2009, 
193, with annotation by Marchadier. 
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that of ‘mater semper certa est’ and that of non-discrimination between legitimate 
and children born out of wedlock83. Besides that, status filiationis sticks out for a 
great regulatory fragmentation at national level. Substantial differences exist 
about establishment and denial of legal parentage, legitimacy of ARTs (assisted 
reproductive techniques), stepchild adoption, adoption by single parent or by 
same-sex couples, etcetera. Where people try to evade domestic legal restrictions 
to establish status filiations abroad, public authorities refuse recognition on 
(international) public policy grounds84. However, children’s vulnerability and 
unawareness require further caution in adopting domestic measures that make 
ineffective and void the status filiationis established abroad. Indeed, international 
human rights undertakings (namely, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child85, Article 8 ECHR and Article 24 EU Charter86) state that insofar as status’ 
cross-border continuity is a fundamental part of the child’s personal identity, 
reference should be made to the best interests of the child. 
Worth mentioning some recent decisions issued by the ECtHR, starting 
from cases Mennesson and Labassee87. They concerned two couples of intended 
 
83 In case Marckx v. Belgium (Application no. 6833/74), the ECtHR acknowledged that a 
common consensus about legal recognition of equality between legitimate and illegitimate 
children exists among the Council of Europe’s Member States. 
84 As we will see infra in this paragraph and in the next one, the public policy exception appears 
more frequently in the context of ARTs. See M. Wells-Greco, The status of children arising from 
inter-country surrogacy arrangements, The Hague, 2015; concerning issue on conflict of law rules, 
see E. Bergamini, Problemi di diritto internazionale privato collegati alla riforma dello status di 
figlio e questioni aperte, in Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale, 2015, 315 ff. To 
what concern adoption, see case Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxemburg and the case-law dealing 
with Islamic kafala (cfr. A. Borrás Rodríguez, The protection of the rights of children and the 
recognition of kafala, in A commitment to private international law: essays in honour of Hans van 
Loon, 2013, 77 ff.; A. Di Pascale, La kalafah al vaglio della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: tra 
tutela dell’interesse del minore e preoccupazioni di ordine pubblico, in Diritto immigrazione e 
cittadinanza, n.4, 2012, 113 ff.), and with homoparental adoption (see G. Rossolillo, 
Riconoscimento di ‘status’ familiari e adozioni sconosciute all’ordinamento italiano, in Diritti umani 
e diritto internazionale, 2016, 335 ff.; C. Mécary, Homoparenté et homoparentalité à la lumière de la 
jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, in Droit des familles, genre et sexualité, 
2012, 227 ff.) 
85 Article 3 of the CRC states that ‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’. However, several other articles 
of the Convention make explicit reference to this principle, in relation to family ties (see 
Article 9, 18, 20, 21, 37). 
86 For a commentary see R. Lamont, Article 24, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward 
(Eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – A Commentary, Oxford, 2014, 209 ff. 
87 Decisions issued on 26 June 2014, cases no. 65192/2011 and no. 65941/2011. See H. 
Fulchiron, C. Bidaud-Garon, Reconnaissance ou reconstruction?: à propos de la filiation des enfants 
nés par GPA, au lendemain des arrêts Labassée, Mennesson et Campanelli-Paradiso de la Cour 
européenne des droits de l’homme, in Revue critique de droit international privé, 2015, 1 ff.; P. 
Beaumont and K. Trimmings, Recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the 
area of cross-border surrogacy: is there still a need for global regulation of surrogacy?, Working Paper 
No 2015/2; R. Baratta, Diritti fondamentali e riconoscimento dello status filii in casi di maternità 
surrogata: la primazia degli interessi del minore, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2016, 309 
ff.; S. Tonolo, Identità personale, maternità surrogata e superiore interesse del minore nella più recente 
giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 9, 
2015, 202 ff.; I. Anrò, Surrogacy from the Luxembourg and Strasbourg perspectives: divergence, 
convergence and the chance for a future dialogue, in Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2016, 465 ff. These 
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parents who travelled to the USA for the sole purpose of contracting a surrogate88. 
The applicants were all French citizens who applied for registration of the 
children’s birth certificate in the French civil register. In doing so, they ran into 
France’s law prohibiting surrogacy as a public policy rule from which parties have 
no freedom to derogate. Moreover, they committed fraude à la loi, as the procedure 
to have a baby abroad was entered for the sole purpose of avoiding or 
circumventing the application of French law. 
In previous similar cases, domestic courts did not recognize the 
paramountcy of the interest of the child when dealing with fraude à la loi89. The 
same happened to the Mennessons and the Labassees. Thus, they brought the case 
before the ECtHR, which found a breach of Article 8 ECHR. Indeed, everyone has 
the right to «establish the substance of his or her identity», and parent-child 
relationship is part of it.90 Non-recognition of the legal parent-child relationship 
that had been established abroad «undermined the children’s identity within 
French society».91 Therefore, insofar as an essential aspect of one’s identity is at 
stake, the margin of appreciation afforded to the State must be reduced92 despite 
the lack of a consensus on the discipline of surrogacy and despite any public policy 
and fraude à la loi argument. 
Where it is in the best interest of the child to enjoy private and family life 
together with intended parents, a child born as a result of international 
 
were the first cases in which the Court examined the refusal to recognize the parent-child 
relationships between children born from a surrogate mother abroad and the couple who had 
recurred to the surrogacy agreement. Three other similar cases were then brought before the 
Court: case Laborie v. France (no. 44024/13), case Foulon v. France (no. 9063/14) and case 
Bouvet v. France (no. 10410/14). See. M. Gervasi, The European Court of Human Rights and 
Technological Development: The Issue of the Continuity of the Family Status Established Abroad 
Through Recourse to Surrogate Motherhood, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2018, 213 ff. 
Other cases where applicants relied on Article 8 ECHR to challenge administrative decisions 
in their home states refusing to legally recognize parent-child relationships established abroad 
between children born as a result of surrogacy are cases Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy 
(Application no. 25358/12), and D and others v. Belgium (Application no. 29176/13). 
88 Surrogacy agreements are concluded by a woman who bears a child for a couple who takes 
responsibility for the plans and for conception, and to whom the child will be handed over 
after his or her birth. In a surrogacy agreement, the gametes may come either from the couple 
seeking to have a child (the intended parents), or from one member of that couple, or from two 
donors, including the surrogate mother. 
89 French Cour de cassation (1ere chambre civile), on 13 September 2013, rejected the 
applicant’s request for the parent-child relationship to be recognized. Considering that: «(...) 
en l’état du droit positif, est justifié le refus de transcription d’un acte de naissance fait en pays 
étranger […] en fraude à la loi française, d’un processus d’ensemble comportant une 
convention de gestation pour le compte d’autrui, convention qui, fût-elle licite à l’étranger, est 
nulle d’une nullité d’ordre public aux termes des articles 16-7 et 16-9 du code civil ; […] en 
présence de cette fraude, ni l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant que garantit l’article 3, § 1, de la 
Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, ni le respect de la vie privée et familiale au 
sens de l’article 8 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales ne sauraient être utilement invoqués; (...)», the Court of Appeal had rightly 
inferred from the fact that there had been a fraud on the part of the first applicant and that the 
recognition of paternity had to be annulled. 
90 Menesson, para. 99. 
91 Ibid, para. 96. 
92 Ibid, para. 80. 
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commercial surrogacy has the right to have the relationships with his/her 
biological parents legally recognized93. The ECtHR thus considers the best 
interests of the child as a ‘counter-limit’ to public policy exception94: the former 
must be guaranteed as a priority and is, therefore, part of those values that must 
prevail over the application of the latter95. As the ECtHR stated in Labassee, a State 
may wish to deter national citizens from going abroad to benefit from methods of 
assisted reproduction prohibited in its own territory.96 Nonetheless, where 
consequences of evasion of law substantially affect children’s right to respect for 
their private life, respect for the children’s best interests imposes recognition97. 
The CJEU has not yet intervened in the matter of recognition of the child 
status tout court. However, protection of the child’s interests–i.e. not depriving 
him/her of an effective family, avoiding to bear severe adverse consequences in 
terms of identity, maintenance, inheritance rights, etcetera–under Article 24 EU 
Charter must lead to an almost absolute compression of the margin discretion of 
Member State in in cases similar to Mennesson and Labassee.  
Indeed, there is no doubt that failing to recognize parent-child relationship 
in the host State would deprive the child of almost any legal protection. Hence, 
where recognition of status filiationis is linked to EU law and there’s a genetic link 
between the child and the parent seeking for recognition, Article 24 EU Charter 
may impose the forum’s State to ‘neutralise’ fraude à la loi or public policy concerns 
if it is in the best interest of the child 98. 
9. Status filiationis and public policy: recent developments before the 
ECtHR and European domestic courts. 
A gradual implementation of the principles developed by the Strasbourg Court 
 
93 However, in its judgment of 24 January 2017 in Paradiso and Campanelli (supra in note 87) 
the Grand Chamber acknowledged, at para. 53, that a de facto family life between an adult and 
a child can exist even «in the absence of biological ties or a recognised legal tie, provided that 
there are genuine personal ties». For a detailed analysis of the Grand Chamber decision see P. 
Beaumont and K. Trimmings, Surrogacy before the European Court of Human Rights, in J. 
Scherpe, C. Fenton-Glynn, T. Kaan (eds), Eastern and Western Perspectives on Surrogacy, 
Cambridge, 2018, 329 ff. 
94 S. Tonolo, Identità personale, maternità surrogata e superiore interesse del minore, cit., 206-7. 
95 Cfr. C. Ragni, Gestazione per altri e riconoscimento dello status di figlio, in GenIUS, 2016/1, 6 
ff. 
96 See Labassee, cit., § 62 and 63. 
97 R. Baratta, Recognition of a foreign status filii: pursuing the best interests principle, in E. 
Bergamini, C. Ragni (Eds), Fundamental rights and best interest of the child in transnational 
families, London, forthcoming, at para. 3, outlines ‘the best interests of the child test’. It 
«entails to assess the real and genuine interest of the child in any specific situation whenever 
a form of international filiation comes under national authorities’ scrutiny. Actually, any 
decision on care of a child must be based on pragmatic evaluation of the child’s concrete 
welfare while considering every element of the case». 
98 However, recognition can encourage cross-border commercial surrogacy, thus origining 
some serious human rights issues that usually concerns women and children involved this 
kind of surrogacy, notably exploitation of women and treating children like object for sale. 
See P. Beaumont, K. Trimmings, Surrogacy before the European Court of Human Rights, supra in 
note 93. 
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concerning the protection of the best interests of the child and of private and 
family life, is ongoing before the courts of the EU Member States to justify the 
recognition of status filiationis related to surrogacy, medically assisted 
procreation, joint adoption, and step and second parent parenthood. Indeed, the 
above described evolution of the relationship between status filiationis, public 
policy and evasion of law seems to progressively gain consensus in national courts.  
Decisions no. 4481/1299 and 19599/16100 of the Italian Corte di Cassazione 
upheld a perspective of the concept of international public policy no longer seen 
as a shield towards foreign and supranational law, but rather as a gate devoted to 
opening the interaction between the national legal system and the international 
community as a whole, as the latter expresses principles that are generally shared 
and released from the incidental and discretionary choice of national legislators. 
Thus, public policy stands as a bulwark not for the whole national legal system, 
but only for one of those fundamental principles that qualify its essential core and 
are harmonized within the International community101. 
More recently, and for the second time, the German Bundesgerichtshof 
affirmed that the child has the right to be recognized as the son of both his/her 
parents, including the merely intended (non-biological) one, following surrogacy 
in the United States102. 
 
99 On the registration of a same-sex marriage established abroad. See C. Sgobbo, Il matrimonio 
celebrato all’estero tra persone dello stesso sesso: la Cassazione abbandona la qualifica di «atto 
inesistente» approdando a quella di «non idoneo a produrre effetti giuridici nell’ordinamento interno», 
in Giustizia Civile, 2013, 2183 ff. 
100 On the registration in the civil status register of the foreign birth certificate including the 
names of two mothers. See G. Ferrando, Ordine pubblico e interesse del minore nella circolazione 
degli status filiationis, in Corriere giuridico, 2017, n. 2, 190 ff.; O. Feraci, Ordine pubblico e 
riconoscimento in Italia dello status di figlio “nato da due madri” all’estero: considerazioni critiche 
sulla sentenza della Corte di Cassazione n. 19599/2016, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2017, 
169 ff. On the following judgments issued by the Corte di Cassazione see C. Baruffi, Diritto 
internazionale privato e tutela degli status acquisiti all’estero. Le incertezze della Corte di Cassazione 
con riguardo alla maternità surrogata, in A. Di Stasi, Cittadinanza, cittadinanze e nuovi status: 
profili internazionalistici ed europei e sviluppi nazionali, Neaples, 2018, 161 ff.; E. Falletti, Il 
riconoscimento in Italia dello status di figlio nato da surrogacy straniera, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 
2018, 1830 ff. See also Corte d’Appello di Trento, 23 February 2017, on the transcription in 
the civil status register of the foreign birth certificate including the names of two fathers; 
Corte d’Appello di Napoli, 30 March 2016, on the co-parental adoption asked by a female 
couple; Tribunale per i minorenni di Firenze, decrees of 7 March 2017, cases no. 105/15, 
211/2015 A and 212/2015 A, on the adoption pronounced abroad, of children who are 
nationals of that State, adopted by Italian citizens residing in that State. 
101 As noted A. Schillaci, Le vie dell’amore sono infinite. La Corte di cassazione e la trascrizione 
dell’atto di nascita straniero con due genitori dello stesso sesso, online at www.articolo29.it/, the 
Italian Court recalls a decision of the German Bundesgerichtshof that recognized the 
transcription of the birth certificate of a child born following international surrogacy that 
mentioned as parents the intended parents (who were a male couple). See BGH, 10-19 
December 2014, X. v. Land of Berlin. 
102 Judgment of 5 September 2018, XII ZB 224/17, online at 
www.jurion.de/urteile/bgh/2018-09-05/xii-zb-224_17/. See A. Schuster, La Corte federale 
tedesca si esprime ancora in materia di GPA, online at www.articolo29.it/2019/13045/#more-
13045. The first judgment is of 12 December 2014. See R. De Felice, Maternità surrogata e 
ordine pubblico internazionale: Germania e Italia a confronto, online at 
www.personaedanno.it/articolo/maternit-surrogata-e-ordine-pubblico-internazionale-
germania-e-italia-a-confronto-roberto-de-felice. 
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This approach greatly expands the children’s expectation of recognition to 
a potentially huge amount of cases in which no hope of obtaining recognition could 
be previously nurtured. Moreover, domestic courts’ approach somehow goes 
beyond that of ECtHR in Mennesson and Labassee, as the former implicitly 
acknowledges the worthiness of protection for those family status that were 
established abroad for the sole reason of the legal (and not de facto) impossibility 
to validly establish them in the State of residence–thus making irrelevant any kind 
of status’ stability and the genuineness of the link with the lex causae irrelevant–
and for relationships with non-biological parents. 
The most recent judgment on this matter is, however, a historical one. The 
ECtHR has indeed published its first advisory opinion on a surrogacy rights 
case103, at the request of the French Court of Cassation. The Court unanimously 
declared that the child’s right to respect for private life within the meaning of 
Article 8 ECHR requires that domestic law provide a possibility of recognition of 
a legal parent-child relationship with the commissioning mother, where she is 
designated in the foreign birth certificate as the ‘legal mother’ and where the legal 
parent-child relationship with the intended father has been recognized in domestic 
law. States’ margin of appreciation is highly narrowed, because status filiationis is 
not just a matter of identity; indeed, it concerns essential aspect of the child’s 
private life. Therefore, a possibility of recognition is due. However, States are not 
necessarily required to recognize the legal parent-child relationship with the 
intended mother in the specific form of registering the birth certificate in the civil 
registers. Other means of recognition, as adoption or court proceedings not 
involving adoption, may be used insofar as they are suitable to protect the best 
interests of the child «promptly and effectively»104. 
Today, as a survey undertaken by the ECtHR and mentioned in the advisory 
opinion shows105, more than thirty Council of Europe’s Member States permit the 
intended (biological) father to establish paternity after surrogacy, while some 
twenty Member States permit the establishment of legal parent-child relationship 
between children and the intended (non-biological) mother. 
10. Conclusion. 
In presence of a very fragmented legal framework, in which the EU legislator 
cannot uniformly regulate families (unless with regard to specific aspects), 
Member States are still willing to maintain their sovereignty. Indeed, where 
Member States wanted automatic recognition of foreign measures through 
common rules, they expressly did so establishing proper EU PIL rules. 
 
103 Advisory opinion of 10 April 2019, concerning the recognition in domestic law of a legal 
parent-child relationship between a child born through a gestational surrogacy arrangement 
abroad and the intended mother (Request no. P16-2018-001). The opinion is delivered under 
Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol no. 16. Its value lies in providing the national courts with guidance 
on questions of principle relating to the ECHR applicable in similar cases. 
104 Ibid., para. 55. 
105 Ibid., paras. 22-24 
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Nonetheless, we could affirm that free movement and protection of fundamental 
rights of EU citizens must influence the recognition of family status, even though 
States expressly decided to keep their competence on this subject. The European 
Union is not just a common market anymore. It is first an area in which individuals 
are protected as the main beneficiaries of integration, while integration is sought 
through common values and fundamental rights. Hence, although the process of 
integration of the European Union cannot lead to a harmonization of family law, 
promoting free movement within an area of freedom, security and justice claims 
at least mutual recognition of the treatment of persons and families.  
Nonetheless, duty of recognition does not prevent States from enjoying 
some space for manoeuvre insofar as national legal orders do not share the same 
foundational values in family matters or the host State’s national identity itself 
would be harmed in case of recognition. Yet, we have to acknowledge that the 
CJEU recognizes to States the power to restrict circulation of status acquired 
abroad. Therefore, this paper did not intend to theorize, in the sphere of family 
law, the replacement (in any case) of EU law to national laws and jurisdictions, 
which are closer to the legal, cultural and social realities in which the disputes 
covered by this study sink their roots. Instead, it aimed at drawing the boundaries 
of ‘EU control’ on the choices and decisions made on such topic at domestic level, 
so that these choices do not frustrate the very essence of the European Union 
citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights. Indeed, restrictions are 
allowed only as long as there is proportionality between the restrictive measure 
and the goals it pursues, and proportionality calls for strict compliance with 
human rights. Notably, when it comes to public policy, the protection of the EU 
citizens’ identity and status, covered by the fundamental right to private and 
family life, should be a sufficient reason to resize, under certain circumstances, the 
sovereignty of the EU Member States’ legal orders, through a greatly attenuated 
public policy clause, due to their belonging to a community of highly integrated 
supranational law. 
The fragmentation of substantive family law and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, while being both an inevitable consequence of the current distribution of 
competences between States and the European Union, do not always constitute 
sufficient grounds for a strong closing by individual jurisdictions to family 
patterns legally accessible in another Member Union, and still less when the best 
interests of the child are at stake. Indeed, being part of a community based on 
integration, on the protection of fundamental rights and on the utmost relevance 
of the right of citizens to freely establish and strengthen their family life within 
the EU, requires Member States to cooperate in a ‘unified transnational 
perspective’, in order to allow the continuity of the legal status of the individual 
where the free movement of persons may lead to conflicts between national 
jurisdictions. 
EU law must protect EU citizens’ rights against any domestic prerogative 
which is non strictly essential in the light of EU values and principles. Protecting 
such values and principles may require to set aside the differences between 
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Member States and to circumscribe the exercise of their discretion (rectius: 
sovereignty) still reserved to them in the subject-matter. Therefore, I think it’s 
time for a new, unwritten goal to be put under the responsibility of EU law. That 
is stabilizing unity of citizens’ personal and family status in cross-border contexts, 
in order to best ensure the respect for their (fundamental) right to private and 
family life while enjoying the effectiveness of free movement in a much broader 
array of situations than ever before.  
 
